Loper Bright

Earlier this summer, I highlighted the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Hospital Menonita and its rejection of deference to the National Labor Relations Board.  Last week, in Siren Retail Corporation v. NLRB, the Second Circuit joined the ranks of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits by emphasizing the judiciary’s obligation, after Loper Bright, to…

One of the more doctrinally vexing passages in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo is the Supreme Court’s admonition that, notwithstanding the significant doctrinal change caused by the overruling of Chevron, “holdings of those cases” previously decided under that interpretive framework would “still [be] subject to statutory stare decisis.”  As Chief Justice Roberts explained, “[m]ere reliance…

Last month, Americans for Prosperity Foundation (“AFPF”) hosted a special summit marking the two-year anniversary of the Supreme Court’s momentous decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo.  The event was well attended, and registrants spent a half-day listening to experts explore how Loper Bright is driving the Trump Administration’s regulatory agenda and giving Congress the opportunity to reassert its Article I authority and rethink its relationship with the administrative state.  While most public debate about Loper Bright understandably has focused on developments…

By John J. Vecchione  Ryan Mulvey has ably discussed the implications of the history and holding of Hospital Menonita de Guayanma v. NLRB in these pages.  To sum up, the NLRB had a successor-bar rule requiring that an employer deal with a union for a year after taking over the company based on an irrebuttable…

In Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit recently flagged an interesting impact Loper Bright might have on administrative law. Judge Henderson’s opinion suggests the possibility that, after Loper Bright, the Chenery doctrine—which holds that “reviewing courts ‘must judge the propriety of [agency] action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency’”—may not apply to “pure statutory interpretation questions.” This question matters because in challenges to agency decisions like federal regulations and adjudications, to the extent the Chenery doctrine applies it…

Earlier this spring, in Rutherford v. United States, the Supreme Court held the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) was inconsistent with the underlying statutory text, and that nonretroactive changes in sentencing law could not qualify as “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to justify early release.  That decision, and its explanation of the principles that limit the Commission’s delegated authority, accentuates how Loper Bright v. Raimondo now binds every agency—including the Commission.   In her opinion for the majority, Justice Barrett…