Yesterday, in American Clinical Laboratory Ass’n v. FDA, a Texas district court properly relied on Loper Bright  to reject the FDA’s attempted ultra vires expansion of its jurisdiction under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) to regulate, for the first time, laboratory testing services as manufactured “devices.”  Ever since City of Arlington, court deference to an agency’s assertion of the scope of its own jurisdiction had been a problem.  Loper Bright is the remedy for that ailment. 

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has denied the federal government’s emergency request to stay a pair of temporary restraining orders in J.G.G. v. Trump, a high-profile case challenging the Trump Administration’s invocation of the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 (“AEA”).  Somewhat unexpectedly, the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo was prominently cited by Judge Patricia Millet in her concurrence.  Millet offered Loper Bright as support for the notion that important questions of statutory construction—here, the scope of review under the AEA and the meaning of predicates for presidential action—were squarely within the judicial ken and thus not non-justiciable under the political-question doctrine.  It remains unclear whether that assertion is correct or if Loper Bright impacts the political-question doctrine at all. 

The AEA provides that “[w]henever there is a declared war between the United States and any foreign nation or government,” or an “invasion or predatory incursion” against the territory of the United States by a “foreign nation or government,” the President shall have the authority, following issuance of a “public proclamation,” to detain and remove “all native, citizens, denizens or subjects” of that hostile nation or government who are over the age of fourteen.  On its face, the AEA provides the executive branch with seemingly extraordinary discretion to determine whether there is a qualifying “invasion or predatory incursion,” or even whether there exists a state of “declared war.”¹  Once those preconditions are established, the President also seems to enjoy broad authority to detain and deport noncitizens to which an AEA proclamation applies. 

Background on J.G.G. Case

The J.G.G. case involves five Venezuelan nationals whom the Administrations has determined are members of the international criminal gang and designated terrorist organization, “Tren de Aragua” (“TdA”).  In mid-March, President Trump issued a proclamation under the AEA declaring TdA to be “perpetrating, attempting, and threatening an invasion or predatory incursion,” either “directly”—that is, as a de facto government—or as an effective agent of the Venezuelan government.  The plaintiffs contest the proclamation, as applied to them, and seek a court order to prevent their removal.  So far, they have successfully certified a provisional class on behalf of all suspected TdA members, as well as temporary restraining orders suspending the government’s removal efforts. 

The J.G.G. case is procedurally complex and implicates deeply contested and difficult questions about jurisdiction, the availability and scope of judicial review, venue, justiciability and the political-question doctrine, and procedural regularity. 

The Impact of Loper

As far as the reference Loper Bright is concerned, Judge Millet used the decision to support her argument that the government cannot sidestep judicial review of its use of the AEA by claiming sole interpretative authority for when the AEA’s preconditions are triggered: 

Like Judge Henderson, Millet’s argument about the scope of review under the AEA seems to depend on her view that it is the job of courts to interpret statutory terms, even when those terms are found in statutes implicating core Article II authority.  On her view, insofar as statutory language can be construed without reference to political judgments, the political-question doctrine does not apply.  Thus, again citing Loper Bright, Judge Millet insists the AEA’s phrases “invasion,” “predatory incursion,” and “foreign nation or government” are all “objectively discernable from statutory text and context,” and present an question of interpretation rather than presidential discretion.  “The judiciary can resolve this disagreement with settled tools of statutory construction,” she writes. 

Judge Walker, who dissented from the denial of the government’s emergency motion, did not address the scope of judicial review under the AEA or whether the political-question doctrine applied.  He argued instead that the government should win for a “technical, but important, reason,” namely, that the plaintiffs’ “claims sound in habeas” and should have been raised in Texas, where they are currently detained.  In this regard, Walker observed that “the few [AEA] cases on the books almost invariably arose through habeas petitions[.]” 

Yesterday, the Bipartisan Policy Center hosted a launch event on its report, “Legislating After Loper: Practical Solutions for a Post-Chevron Congress,” written by members of its Working Group on Congress, Courts, and Administrative Law.

The Working Group is co-chaired by Former Senators Heidi Heitkamp (D-ND) and Mel Martinez (R-FL) along with eight working group members. 

The Working Group Report included four recommendations: 

1. Empower congressional committees in their essential role as sources of knowledge and deliberation. 

Any effort to change the way Congress legislates and improves its deliberations must start with its committees. By a variety of indicators, the role of congressional committees has shifted over time, from policy development to executive branch oversight. The Working Group recommends enhancing the policy role of congressional committees by allocating additional resources to them and altering their operations. 

2. Expand the resources available to Congress for drafting legislation, crafting clear language, and understanding constitutional and legal dynamics around proposed bills. 

The Supreme Court expects greater clarity and precision from Congress in how it writes laws and delegates implementation authority to regulatory agencies. Achieving this—and addressing other aspects of Court jurisprudence—will require additional resources to build capacity so legal and constitutional issues can be better addressed. 

3. Strengthen the ability of Congress to provide guidance and direction regarding statutory interpretation and congressional purpose. 

Interpretation of legislation passed by Congress will receive new emphasis following recent Supreme Court decisions. We recommend steps—such as clarification of definitions and new resources—that can bolster Congress’ role in how statutes are interpreted by others, particularly agencies, courts, other government bodies, and the private sector. 

4. Enhance the ability of Congress to work productively with regulatory agencies by updating laws, particularly agencies’ authorizing statutes. 

Congress frequently fails to reauthorize programs and agencies in a timely manner, leaving a vacuum of interpretation and implementation. We recommend actions—such as retrospective review by agencies—to enhance the learning process for Congress and agencies, so that the legislative process and subsequent implementation by the executive branch can be improved. 

The Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA) defines “firearm” to include “(A) any weapon . . . which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; [and] (B) the frame or receiver of any such weapon.” 18 U. S. C. §921(a)(3). Those engaged in importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms must obtain federal licenses, keep sales records, conduct background checks, and mark their products with serial numbers. 

In 2022, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) adopted a rule interpreting the Act to cover weapon parts kits, and “partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional” frames or receivers. Plaintiff brought a facial challenge under the APA, arguing that the GCA cannot be read to reach such kits, frames, or receivers and challenging the agency’s authority to regulate them. The remedy for such as challenge would be for the court to “set aside” the rule, essentially nullifying it. This is a statutory interpretation case, not a Second Amendment case. 

SCOTUS Upholds ATF Interpretation

In upholding the ATF’s interpretation of the GCA, the Court in Bondi v. Vanderstock reviewed the variety of applications the ATF made over the decades and noted that “the agency has consistently interpreted subsection (B) to reach some unfinished frames and receivers”.  Thus, applying Loper Bright, the Court upheld the ATF’s interpretation, explaining that:

while “courts must exercise independent judgment in determining the meaning of statutory provisions,” the contemporary and consistent views of a coordinate branch of government can provide evidence of the law’s meaning. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369, 394 (2024). 

The ATF’s consistent prior practice, coupled with the lack of conflict between the rule and the text of the GCA carried the day.  

Other Comments

Case Western Law Professor Jonathan Adler also noted the Loper Bright citation, writing:

This reference to Loper Bright Enterprises underscores that the justices are concerned about the sort of dynamic that motivated the major questions decisions–the discovery of latent, previously undiscovered and unheralded sources of agency authority in long extant statutes–and not about disregarding agency interpretations altogether. It also suggests that the Trump Administration can expect resistance if it seeks to adopt new interpretations of old statutes, particularly where there is a long history of consistent agency understanding and application of the law in question.

Last fall, Lesko v. United States—an appeal of a decision from the Court of Federal Claims about an Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) regulation—was argued before a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  This week, however, following a sua sponte poll of the Circuit’s full bench, the court ordered the appeal to be heard en banc, directed the parties to file new briefs, and invited amicus involvement.  The Circuit has instructed the renewed briefing to address the specific impact of the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo overruling the forty-year-old Chevron doctrine, which required federal courts to defer to federal agencies’ views on what the law is under certain circumstances.

The issue in Lesko is whether a nurse practitioner who worked at the Indian Health Service was erroneously denied enhanced pay, and therefore overtime, for working nights, Sundays, and holidays.  In March 2023, the Court of Federal Claims answered that question in the negative because the nurse practitioner’s work outside of regular hours was not officially scheduled “in writing,” as required by an OPM regulation.  The Lesko court reached that conclusion based on the Federal Circuit’s past decision in Doe v. United States, which found that a Federal Employees Pay Act provision authorizing overtime pay only when it’s “officially ordered or approved” was ambiguous.  As a result of the ambiguity, the Doe court granted Chevron deference to an OPM regulation requiring, among other things, written authorization as a condition of receiving overtime pay.

During the pendency of Ms. Lesko’s appeal, the legal landscape has shifted.  In May 2023, the Supreme Court granted cert in Loper Bright on the question of whether to overrule or clarify the Chevron-deference doctrine.  As Ms. Lesko’s opening brief noted, given that Doe turned on Chevron deference, her appeal, which similarly “involve[d] issues of Chevron deference to agency regulations,” would likely be impacted by the eventual outcome in Loper Bright.  Of course, that was an understatement, considering the sweep of the Supreme Court’s June 2024 decision:

Chevron is overruled.  Courts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, as the APA requires.  Careful  attention to the judgment of the Executive Branch may help inform that inquiry.  And when a particular statute delegates authority to an agency consistent with constitutional limits, courts must respect the delegation, while ensuring that the agency acts within it.  But courts need not and under the APA may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.

Unsurprisingly, Ms. Lesko brought this development to the Federal Circuit’s attention in a FRAP 28(j) letter filed in September 2024.  Oral argument was then held in October before Chief Judge Moore, Judge Chen, and Judge Stoll.  But before the panel issued its opinion the full Federal Circuit decided sua sponte to hear the case en banc—that is, with all of its judges—and requested new briefs with a second argument set for September 2025. 

The Federal Circuit has requested briefing on the following questions:  

Specifically, the Federal Circuit has requested briefing on the following questions:  

• Considering Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), how should “officially ordered or approved” in 5 U.S.C. § 5542(a) be interpreted?

• Is this a case in which “the agency is authorized to exercise a degree of discretion” such that OPM has authority to adopt its writing requirement? Loper, 603 U.S. at 394.

• Is there a statutory provision (e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 5548) that provides such authority?

The Court also invited amicus participation to assist in resolving those questions.

The first question appears to go to what the “best reading” of the relevant statute is.  After all, as Loper Bright teaches, “statutes, no matter how impenetrable, do—in fact, must—have a single, best meaning” that “is fixed at the time of enactment.”  And “[i]n the business of statutory interpretation, if it is not the best, it is not permissible.”

The second and third questions concern the broader issue of whether OPM’s overtime regulation imposing a writing requirement is beyond its power.  Put another way, did Congress delegate to OPM the power to decide what requirements must be met for overtime to be “officially ordered or approved”?  For context, the Federal Circuit’s order quotes from the following passage in  Loper Bright:

In a case involving an agency . . . the statute’s meaning may well be that the agency is authorized to exercise a degree of discretion.  Congress has often enacted such statutes.  For example, some statutes “expressly delegate[ ]” to an agency the authority to give meaning to a particular statutory term.  Others empower an agency to prescribe rules to “fill up the details” of a statutory scheme or to regulate subject to the limits imposed by a term or phrase that “leaves agencies with flexibility,” such as “appropriate” or “reasonable.”

When the best reading of a statute is that it delegates discretionary authority to an agency, the role of the reviewing court . . . [is] to independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress subject to constitutional limits.  The court fulfills that role by recognizing constitutional delegations, “fix[ing] the boundaries of [the] delegated authority,” and ensuring the agency has engaged in “‘reasoned decisionmaking’” within those boundaries[.]

It will be interesting to see how the full Federal Circuit thinks through these questions and what broader implications the ultimate decision will have given OPM’s government-wide responsibilities.

Loper Bright has reached the Court of Federal Claims for review of bid protests under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). 

QED GROUP LLC v. USA, No. 1:2024cv01961 – Document 47 (Fed. Cl. 2025)

In a dispute over whether a prospective bidder for a broad pre-approved vendor list could be excluded because it was subject to a waiver on an existing contract, the Court of Claims applied the requirements of Loper Bright, and its instruction regarding Skidmore and Auer deference, to side with the bidder.  

Section 889 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act prohibits federal executive agencies from contracting with an entity that uses “covered telecommunications equipment” as a substantial or essential component of any system where “covered telecommunications equipment includes equipment produced by entities headquartered in China” or “that the Secretary of Defense … reasonably believes to be an entity owned or controlled by, or other-wise connected to, the government of [China].” 

Two subsections (d)(1) and (d)(2) allow for waivers. Section (d)(1) applies to waivers by an agency head and includes a variety of limitation on time and scope. Section (d)(2) applies to waivers by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and is not subject to the same limitations.  

Q2 Impact was covered by a DNI waiver under §(d)(2) for its contract supporting a USAID learning activity in Egypt. As a result, when the General Services Administration solicited proposals for its OASIS+ program, GSA found Q2 Impact ineligible to be placed on a pre-approved providers list because of its existing DNI waiver, explaining it was “unable to enter into a contract with any entity that represents it ‘DOES’ use covered telecommunications equipment or services …”.  

Q2 Impact filed suit in the Court of Claims alleging that the government relied on the wrong subsection of §889 to exclude it.  

The Court of Claims reviews bid protests under the APA, which provides that a reviewing court shall set aside agency action that “not in accordance with law.” Such review, like agency interpretations of the Constitution—is not entitled to deference. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 391-92 (2024). And thus it “remains the responsibility of the court to decide whether the law means what the agency says.”  

Using the standard tools of statutory construction, such as whether the law has a “plain and unambiguous meaning” and the “context in which that language is used” and the “broader context of the statute as a whole” the court determined that Q2 Impact had the correct interpretation of § 889. 

To reach this conclusion, the court compared Section (d)(1) waivers with Section (d)(2) waivers.  

The government argued that where a provider and “covered product” has been granted a waiver under a particular contract, a new contracting agency must get a separate waiver under the new contract regardless of whether the original waiver was granted under §(d)(1) or §(d)(2). The Court of Claims disagreed, looking first for any statutory language providing deference to the government’s position. Finding none, it applied Loper Bright:   

In Loper Bright, the Supreme Court recently held that “[s]ection 706 [of the APA] makes clear that agency interpretations of statutes … are not entitled to deference. … [I]t thus remains the responsibility of the court to decide whether the law means what the agency says.” Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 391-92 (citations and quotation marks omitted).  

But that was not the end of the inquiry, because under Skidmore, an agency’s  

“interpretations constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance consistent with the APA.” Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 394 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).  

Moreover, when interpreting its own rule or regulation, Auer deference may apply if three requirements are satisfied.  

(1) “the regulatory interpretation must be the agency’s authoritative or official position, rather than [an] ad hoc statement not reflecting the agency’s views”; (2) “the agency’s interpretation must in some way implicate its substantive expertise”; and (3) the “agency’s reading of a rule must reflect its fair and considered judgment.” Id. at 577-79.  

The court held that no deference applied because the government’s interpretation addressed only the agency-head waiver process, not the DNI waiver process. Relative to DNI waivers, the government had not released considered guidance related to the applicable subsection and only three DNI waivers were identified as the historical pool of waivers to evaluate agency practice, including the waiver applicable here. This was not sufficient, leaving the court to “determine the meaning of § 889(d)(2) and rule 4.2104(b) without formal deference to GSA’s interpretation in the government’s briefs. Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 391-92.” 

Because the court determined that the clearest reading the DNI waiver subsection is that it applies only to the equipment and contract for which the waiver is given, prohibiting equipment subject to the waiver from being used for any other contract, the contractor is not prohibited from receiving other government contracts that would not use the covered equipment. The court then addressed the policy concerns presented by the government and held “[u]nder Loper Bright, the courts cannot construe the law ‘with an eye to policy preferences that had not made it into the statute.’ Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 403-04.” 

Applying Loper Bright all the government’s claims for deference were rejected and petitioner’s interpretation prevailed.   

The event will discuss how the Loper and other court decisions “pose challenges for Congress in how it legislates and directs regulatory agencies. They also underscore existing concerns over congressional capacity, internal processes, and the legislative branch’s ability to tackle complex policy challenges. Last year, BPC established the Working Group on Congress, Courts, and Administrative Law to identify concrete, bipartisan steps that Congress can take to address the questions raised by the Court. A report detailing the Working Group’s findings will be released alongside the event and available on BPC’s website.”

Speakers, moderators, and panelists include:

• Rep. Joe Morelle (NY-25) | Ranking Member, Committee on House Administration
• Heidi Heitkamp | Co-Chair, Working Group on Congress, Courts, and Administrative Law; Co-Chair, Farm and Forest Carbon Solutions Task Force; Former U.S. Senator (D-ND)
• Mel Martinez | Co-Chair, Working Group on Congress, Courts, and Administrative Law; Former U.S. Senator (R-FL); Former Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
• Margaret Spellings | President and CEO, Bipartisan Policy Center (Moderator)
• Marci Harris | Co-founder and Executive Director, POPVOX Foundation
• Victoria Nourse | Ralph V. Whitworth Professor in Law, Georgetown Law and Vice Chair, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
• Jeffrey A. Rosen | Nonresident Fellow, AEI and Former Acting U.S. Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General

Event Details and Registration

March 27, 2025 from 9:30 am to 10:30 am EDT

Hybrid Event
Bipartisan Policy Center
1225 Eye Street NW
Washington, D.C

Register here.

Bipartisan Policy Center Working Group on Congress, Courts, and Administrative Law

On December 10, 2024, the Bipartisan Policy Center launched “launched a new Working Group on Congress, Courts, and Administrative Law, led by former Sens. Heidi Heitkamp (D-ND) and Mel Martinez (R-FL), to develop practical tools to help Congress reinvigorate its legislative capabilities following recent Supreme Court rulings, including the overturning of Chevron deference in Loper Bright.”

Working Group Co-Chairs:

• Former Sen. Heidi Heitkamp (D-ND) | Institute Director, The University of Chicago Institute of Politics
• Former Sen. Mel Martinez (R-FL) | Member, Board of Directors, Edward M. Kennedy Institute for the United States Senate

Working Group Members:*

• Corey Astill | Vice President, Health and Retirement, Smart Regulation, Business Roundtable
• Kurt Couchman | Senior Fellow, Fiscal Policy, Americans for Prosperity
• Jen Daulby | CEO, Congressional Management Foundation
• Susan Dudley | The George Washington University
• Former Rep. Allyson Schwartz (D-PA) | Senior Advisor, Leavitt Group; Former U.S. Representative
• Howard Shelanski | Joseph and Madeline Sheehy Chair in Antitrust Law and Trade Regulation; Professor of Law, Georgetown Law
• Jared Thompson | Managing Litigator, Natural Resources Defense Council
• Rob Walters | Retired Partner, Gibson Dunn

The EPA recently announced that it will formally reconsider its 2009 Endangerment Finding in which it deemed carbon dioxide, methane, and four other gases as “air pollutants,” as well as “all of its prior regulations and actions that rely on the Endangerment Finding.” That is a big deal because the Endangerment Finding has been used to justify “seven vehicle regulations with an aggregate cost of more than one trillion dollars” and “has also played a significant role in EPA’s justification of regulations of other sources beyond cars and trucks,” such as power plants.   Needless to say, how this process plays out could have major impacts on the national economy.

But like many such consequential matters, EPA’s reconsideration of Endangerment Finding turns, in part, on questions of statutory interpretation. And as EPA’s announcement notes, after the agency issued the Endangerment Finding in 2009, “major Supreme Court decisions in the intervening years, including Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo . . . have provided new guidance on how the agency should interpret statutes to discern Congressional intent and ensure that its regulations follow the law.”

Background

Under the Clean Air Act, the EPA “Administrator shall by regulation prescribe . . . standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” Under the statute, if EPA makes an endangerment finding with respect to an “air pollutant,” as defined by the CAA, it must then issue regulations.

In a 2007 decision, the Supreme Court ruled 5-4 in Massachusetts v. EPA that greenhouse gases are “air pollutants” and thus EPA has the authority under CAA to regulate new motor vehicles emission of greenhouse gases. But the Court did not address “whether on remand EPA must make an endangerment finding” for greenhouse gases “or whether policy concerns can inform EPA’s actions in the event that it makes such a finding.” Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito, dissented, disagreeing with the majority’s views on the scope of the EPA Administrator’s discretion to make an endangerment finding, as well as the majority’s interpretation of “air pollutant” to necessarily include gases like carbon dioxide. In a colorful footnote, Justice Scalia wrote that “[it] follows” from the majority’s conclusion that carbon dioxide is an “air pollutant” under the CAA “that everything airborne, from Frisbees to flatulence, qualifies as an ‘air pollutant.’ This reading of the statute defies common sense.”

Following Massachusetts v. EPA In 2009, the EPA chose to issue an Endangerment Finding for greenhouse gases and a host of highly consequential regulations flowed from it. EPA is now reconsidering that decision. Loper Bright and other intervening Supreme Court precedent will certainly play a role in that process. 

Enter Loper Bright

Loper Bright overruled Chevron v. NRDC—which required courts to defer to federal agencies’ views on what the law is under certain circumstances—and held that courts may no longer “defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.” As the Supreme Court observed in Loper Bright, “statutes, no matter how impenetrable, do—in fact, must—have a single, best meaning” that “is fixed at the time of enactment.” And “[i]n the business of statutory interpretation, if it is not the best, it is not permissible.” But as the Court noted, “[t]hat is not to say that Congress cannot or does not confer discretionary authority on agencies. Congress may do so, subject to constitutional limits, and it often has.” And as the Court explained, “the statute’s [best] meaning may well be that the agency is authorized to exercise a degree of discretion.” Among other things, some statutes “empower an agency to prescribe rules to ‘fill up the details’ of a statutory scheme or to regulate subject to the limits imposed by a term or phrase that ‘leaves agencies with flexibility,’ such as ‘appropriate’ or ‘reasonable.’” (citations omitted). Footnote 6 of the Court’s opinion in Loper Bright provides two examples of this type of statute, both of which are also administered by EPA and appear to use language that is similar to the provision of the CAA authorizing the EPA Administrator to make endangerment findings.

Given Massachusetts v. EPA’s holding that greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide are subject to regulation under the CAA (regardless of whether that case was correctly decided and what the “best” reading of the CAA’s definition of “air pollutant” is), a salient question in EPA’s reconsideration process is the extent of the EPA Administrator’s “judgment”—that is, discretion or “flexibility,” to borrow from Loper Bright—to decide whether something falling within the statutory definition of “air pollutant” should (or should not) be the subject of an endangerment finding and thus EPA regulation under the CAA. It will be interesting to see how Loper Bright bears on that and other important questions as the EPA formally reconsiders its Endangerment Finding.

Professors Kristin Hickman and Amy Wildermuth have a new article on Loper’s two buckets: “independent judgment for mere statutory interpretation and reasoned decisionmaking for exercises of delegated policymaking discretion.”

Abstract

By overturning Chevron, the Supreme Court’s Loper Bright decision clearly changed the way in which courts must approach agency actions interpreting statutes. But Loper Bright stopped well short of declaring that courts should always ignore agency interpretations and only interpret statutes using their independent judgment. In two critical paragraphs, the Court acknowledged that some statutory provisions delegate discretionary authority to agencies counseled a more restrained judicial review for reasoned decisionmaking when agencies exercise such power. But, whereas Chevron focused nearly exclusively on the statutory word or phrase that an agency was endeavoring to interpret and implement, Loper Bright shifts the analysis at least initially to the delegations themselves-i.e., the statutory terms that give agencies the authority to act in the first place. Drawing on prior work, we propose a framework that categorizes statutory delegations of rulemaking power as specific authority, general authority/housekeeping, and hybrid delegations. We then argue that Loper Bright is best understood and interpreted as demanding independent judgment, potentially influenced by Skidmore‘s contextual factors, for general authority/housekeeping regulations and a more restrained reasoned decisionmaking review for specific authority and hybrid regulations. We explain how this approach harmonizes Loper Bright‘s vision for judicial review of agency action with the Supreme Court’s recent nondelegation and major questions jurisprudence. We also suggest that reading Loper Bright this way will cabin agency discretion in a manner that curtails agency overreach while still allowing executive discretion in implementing and administering statutory requirements.

Access the paper on SSRN.