Lenity After Loper Bright: Deference and Liberty in Criminal Law 

Earlier this spring, in Rutherford v. United States, the Supreme Court held the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) was inconsistent with the underlying statutory text, and that nonretroactive changes in sentencing law could not qualify as “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to justify early release.  That decision, and its explanation of the principles that limit the Commission’s delegated authority, accentuates how Loper Bright v. Raimondo now binds every agency—including the Commission.  

In her opinion for the majority, Justice Barrett cited Loper Bright when describing how the Commission could indeed give meaning to a statute in its Sentencing Guidelines, so long as its policy statements land within boundaries established by Congress, as discerned by the courts.  In the upcoming Term, in Beaird v. United States, the Court will take the proverbial next step by deciding whether so-called “Stinson deference” to the Commission’s commentary on its Guidelines—used to calculate sentences for federal crimes—can or should survive at all. 

The issue in Beaird raises a unique concern absent in discussions about civil-law deference reforms. Whether courts can defer to an agency to resolve ambiguity in a criminal case implicates—indeed, stands in tension with—a long-established canon of statutory construction: the rule of lenity.  

When liberty is at stake, courts should rely on the lenity rule, rather than deference. In Wooden v. United States, Justice Gorsuch explained that lenity ensures individual liberty prevails over ambiguous statutes. It also preserves the separation of powers by keeping the authority to define crimes and punishments with the legislature. Rather than imposing the costs of unclear laws on the defendant, lenity forces Congress to give a clear answer about the meaning of the criminal law. When traditional statutory meaning is opaque, Gorsuch argues, it isn’t the court’s job to rely on legislative history or unexpressed policy purposes for clarity. Instead, the court is obligated to fall back on lenity. 
 

Gorsuch expressed something similar in his Loper Bright concurrence, referring to lenity as “still another of Chevron’s victims.” Under Chevron’s rationale, the government could use ambiguity to punish conduct not expressly prohibited by Congress. Stinson deference presents largely the same problem by requiring ambiguity in the Sentencing Guidelines to be resolved based on the commentary of an unelected Commission. Lenity naturally cuts at the notion of Stinson deference. 
 
Justice Scalia earlier anticipated this very problem in Whitman v. United States, warning that deference to agency interpretations of laws carrying criminal penalties effectively allows federal administrators to create new crimes, relying on ambiguity to justify their decisions. This itself is arbitrary, as there is no reason to assume an agency’s decision is the correct one, considering the range of options left an indeterminate statutory phrase or term. Instead of resolving this vagueness in favor of the defendant—or at least seeking to discern the single, best meaning of the text, as now required under Loper Bright—deference replaced lenity with a “doctrine of severity.” Beaird now gives the Court a chance to rectify this problem identified by Scalia. 
 

Consider the facts in Beaird.  Kendrick Beaird pleaded guilty to a single count of unlawful gun possession. At his sentencing, the district court overruled his objection to a sentencing enhancement based on the seventeen-round magazine attached to his semiautomatic firearm. After rejecting his claim, the court estimated a sentencing range of 63 to 78 months, but this was not based on the text of the Guidelines.  Instead, the sentencing range came from the Commission’s commentary defining what a “large capacity magazine” is for purposes of the large-capacity-magazine enhancement, which received judicial deference.  Beaird and his amici argue that both Loper Bright and Kisor v. Wilkie cast doubt on whether this kind of deference remains valid, as does the rule of lenity.  So, the Supreme Court must now decide whether Stinson still requires courts to defer to the Commission’s interpretation of its own Guidelines. 

Again, Beaird demonstrates why this is all so important.  The Commission’s commentary treats a standard seventeen-round magazine as a “large capacity magazine,” and that definition drove sentencing throughout the proceedings below.  Without the Commission’s interpretation of its own Guidelines, application of that enhancement is dubious.  No statute from Congress sets an enhanced punishment based on these standard magazines. Nor do the Guidelines themselves, which do not define “large capacity magazine.” Instead, Stinson deference to the Commission’s commentary on its Guidelines allowed for an increased penalty based on the large-capacity-magazine enhancement and, at the least, violated lenity by resolving ambiguity against a criminal defendant. 

When Loper Bright reminded us that each statute has a single, best meaning, it forced Congress to take responsibility for what it writes and made the law answerable to the people’s representatives.  Individuals deserve to know what is prohibited and what punishments those prohibitions carry before they are deprived of their liberty. Sadly, Stinson deference has allowed Congress to circumvent this responsibility by handing this authority to an unelected Commission, and moreover, has obstructed the operation of a traditional, pro-liberty interpretive canon—the rule of lenity.  The costs?  A man’s liberty.  Beaird can change that. The freedom of a criminal defendant need not depend on which arbitrary interpretation an unelected agency chooses to impose on an ambiguous statute. If Congress wishes to strip a man of his freedom, it must be clear about why and how.  If it cannot, the Constitution, like lenity, rules in favor of liberty. 

Liam Childers is a policy associate at Americans for Prosperity.