AFL-CIO v. Sonderling: D.C. District Court Weighs In On Statutory Stare Decisis Underscoring Importance of Supreme Court Settling the Question 

By | November 19, 2026

Judge Gavel

Last week, in AFL-CIO v. Sonderling, a federal judge in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia weighed in on an important open question after Loper Bright: how broadly does statutory stare decisis protection of Chevron-era precedent sweep after Loper Bright squarely overruled it? 

By way of background, although Loper Bright overruled Chevron deference moving forward, the Supreme Court qualified the scope of that holding as it applies to Chevron-era precedent upholding agency decisions under that now-defunct framework: “[W]e do not call into question prior cases that relied on the Chevron framework. The holdings of those cases that specific agency actions are lawful—including the Clean Air Act holding of Chevron itself—are still subject to statutory stare decisis despite our change in interpretive methodology.” As we have previously noted, there is an emerging split among lower federal courts as to whether statutory stare decisis only applies to the specific agency action upheld under the Chevron regime or applies more broadly to the agency’s interpretation of statute. (Additional background here, here, here, and here.) The answer to this question matters because interpreting Loper Bright to grant statutory stare decisis protection to agency interpretations of putatively “ambiguous” statutes that could only be justified under Chevron as “reasonable”—as opposed to the best—readings effectively enshrines a body of zombie Chevron-era precedent. Under that interpretation of Loper Bright’s statutory stare decisis passage, as Judge Kethledge has suggested, “Chevron lives on in perpetuity as to any statute that the Supreme Court has ever deemed ambiguous under that doctrine.” Conversely, limiting statutory stare decisis protection flowing from Chevron-era precedent to the specific agency actions at issue ensures that Loper Bright’s promise of de novo review applies to a far greater universe of agency decisions without upsetting legitimate reliance interests.  

Which approach is correct is an important administrative law question that is not going away. Quoting the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Department of Labor v. Americare (covered here),  AFL-CIO v. Sonderling is a recent example of Loper Bright minimalism concluding its statutory stare decisis protections extend to Chevron-era precedent “‘insofar as they interpret the statutes at issue.’” The court there rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that “Loper Bright held only that ‘courts should generally refuse to revisit the lawfulness of “specific agency actions” — particular agency rules or orders — that have already been upheld under the Chevron framework,’” declining to “interpret Loper Bright as so limiting its stare decisis proviso.” It is not alone. Last month, a federal district court judge in Pennsylvania reached a more nuanced conclusion on after Loper Bright statutory stare decisis in Intra-National Home Care v. Department of Labor.  

The Supreme Court now has an opportunity weigh in on this important debate. Americare Healthcare Services, represented by Boyden Gray, has recently asked the Supreme Court to review the Sixth Circuit’s panel decision in Americare. The petition provides an ideal vehicle to, among other things, resolve this circuit split and clarify that under Loper Bright statutory stare decisis for Chevron-era precedent travels with the specific agency action at issue and does not bless or apply to the agency’s broader interpretation of the statute.